About 144 minutes
The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer; the Art of Controversy — Key Ideas to Explore
Logic
33,053 recorded words. 85 minutes difference from this book's estimate.
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About 144 minutes
Logic
33,053 recorded words. 85 minutes difference from this book's estimate.
View Gutenberg source #10731About 163 minutes
Logic
37,300 recorded words. 104 minutes difference from this book's estimate.
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Logic
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Read on Project GutenbergAugustus De Morgan opens his 1839 tract with a precise delimitation: logic, as he defines it, concerns only the structure of inference, not the truth of premises. He illustrates this by recasting a concrete argument—'All men will die; all men are rational beings; therefore some rational beings will die'—into the abstract schema 'Every A is B; Every A is C; therefore some Cs are Bs.' The substitution demonstrates that logical validity holds regardless of whether the premises are factually correct. This early move establishes the author's pedagogical strategy: to train students to see the skeleton of reasoning beneath any content.
De Morgan repeatedly translates ordinary language into letter-variables, a technique he uses to strip arguments of distracting content. In the excerpt, he writes 'Instead of, Write, All men will die. Every A is B.' This is not merely a notational convenience; it is a deliberate method to make the form of reasoning visible. The author assumes his reader—a student beginning Euclid—needs practice in recognizing that the same logical pattern can underlie very different statements. By the end of the tract, the reader is expected to manipulate symbols like 'A', 'B', 'X' fluently, treating them as placeholders for any terms.
De Morgan presents syllogisms as exhaustive tools for deriving conclusions. He lists 'all possible weakest forms' that compare two terms through a third, emphasizing that 'every simple inference can be reduced to one of the preceding forms.' The language is mechanical: premises are 'written in what appeared the most natural order,' and the goal is to ensure the conclusion 'contain no inaccuracy which was not previously asserted.' This framing treats logic as a device for transferring truth from premises to conclusion without loss, a view that aligns with his mathematical background.
De Morgan devotes attention to the 'suppressed premiss'—the unstated assumption that makes an enthymeme valid. He gives the example: 'That race must have possessed some of the arts of life, for they came from Asia.' The missing link, he explains, is 'Every race of Asiatic origin is a race which must have possessed some of the arts of life.' Without that universal proposition, the inference is nonsense. This analysis reveals De Morgan's interest in how ordinary argumentation relies on hidden logical commitments, and his insistence that students learn to expose them.
De Morgan explicitly limits his scope: 'This Tract contains no more than the author has found, from experience, to be much wanted by students who are commencing with Euclid.' He does not claim to cover logic comprehensively, but to provide a 'minimum necessary for a particular purpose.' The preface regrets the neglect of logic and recommends further study. This modesty is strategic: by restricting the tract to syllogistic forms and their application to geometric reasoning, De Morgan avoids overwhelming the beginner while still delivering a rigorous, self-contained introduction.
De Morgan's tract is best read as a practical primer, not a philosophical treatise. The reader should attend to the repeated translation of natural language into symbols, as this is the core skill the author aims to instill. The syllogistic tables, though dense, reward careful study: they are the engine of the book. For students of geometry, the value lies in learning to separate the form of an argument from its subject matter—a discipline that Euclid's proofs demand.
That rainy day, De Morgan’s little book made me see syllogisms as quiet hinges, not truths. His patient separation of shape from fact stayed with me. Later, idly, I found myself pulling down Symbolic Logic — Background and Themes, and it felt less like a next lesson than the same rain, falling on different leaves.
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