The translators' preface to this 1909 edition of Schopenhauer's first volume candidly acknowledges the difficulty of rendering German philosophical prose into English. Haldane and Kemp note that extensive alteration of long, involved sentences risked 'imperilling the meaning,' so they opted for a 'somewhat slavish adherence to Schopenhauer's ipsissima verba.' This choice shapes the entire reading experience: the English text retains the original's periodic structure and conceptual density. The preface also clarifies key terminological decisions, such as translating 'Vorstellung' as 'idea' rather than 'representation,' and capitalizing 'Idea' when it renders 'Idee.' These details matter because Schopenhauer's system hinges on the distinction between the world as idea (Vorstellung) and the world as will (Wille).

Terminological Choices and Their Consequences

The translators' preface reveals a deliberate strategy: 'Vorstellung' becomes 'idea,' while 'Idee' is rendered with a capital 'Idea.' This decision is not merely cosmetic. In Schopenhauer's system, the world as idea is the world of representation, structured by the principle of sufficient reason. The Platonic Ideas, by contrast, are direct objectifications of the will, accessible only through art. By using the same English word with a typographical distinction, the translators preserve the conceptual link while marking the difference. Readers should note that 'idea' (lowercase) refers to ordinary mental representations, while 'Idea' (uppercase) denotes the eternal forms. The preface also explains that 'Anschauung' is translated as 'perception' or 'intuition or perception' depending on context, reflecting the dual nature of immediate sensory awareness in Schopenhauer's epistemology.

The Sublime and the Vanishing Self

In the excerpt on the sublime, Schopenhauer describes how vast spatial or temporal objects—'a very high, vast dome, like that of St. Peter's at Rome'—produce a feeling of the sublime by making us conscious of 'the vanishing nothingness of our own body.' This feeling arises from a contrast: as individuals, we are insignificant phenomena of will, but as 'pure subject of knowing,' we are the supporter of the entire idea. The sublime character, exemplified by Hamlet's Horatio, is one who 'considers men in a purely objective way' and remains unmoved by personal fortune. Schopenhauer explicitly contrasts the sublime with 'the charming or attractive,' which excites the will by presenting its satisfaction. This distinction is central to his aesthetics and ethics.

Structure and Scope of the First Volume

The volume contains four books, as listed in the table of contents. The first two books present the world as idea and as will under the principle of sufficient reason—the domain of science and experience. The third book treats the Platonic Ideas as objects of art, independent of that principle. The fourth book addresses the assertion and denial of the will to live once self-consciousness is attained. The translators remark that the book is 'probably quite intelligible in itself' without Schopenhauer's earlier treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, though they add a footnote to it. This suggests that while the work is self-contained, readers may benefit from supplementary knowledge of Schopenhauer's epistemological foundations.

Readers approaching this volume should attend to the translators' preface as a guide to the text's linguistic texture. The decision to preserve Schopenhauer's sentence structure means that some passages require careful parsing. The excerpts on the sublime offer a concrete entry point into Schopenhauer's method: he moves from a specific perceptual experience to a metaphysical conclusion about the nature of the will and the knowing subject. Keeping the distinction between 'idea' and 'Idea' in mind will help navigate the argument across the four books.