The Ethics of Coöperation — A Reader’s Guide

Diction of Moral Argument

Tufts employs a vocabulary that blends philosophical abstraction with legal and economic precision. He speaks of “reverence and justice” as “ordering principles,” and later invokes “property affected with public interest” and “police power” as doctrines with ethical import beyond their legal scope. His word choices—handicap, inequality, public interest—anchor moral claims in tangible social structures. The repeated use of coöperation (with diaeresis) signals a deliberate, perhaps archaic, emphasis on the term's etymological roots. This diction reflects a philosopher engaging with the language of courts and commerce, not merely abstract ideals.

Structure as Persuasion

The lecture proceeds in five numbered sections, each building a cumulative case. Section I establishes the historical lag between material and social progress. Later sections apply this framework to economic inequality and international relations. Tufts uses a tripartite structure in the final section, presenting three possible world orders—dominance, nationalist competition, and international cooperation—and systematically eliminates the first two. This logical progression mirrors the rhetorical strategy of a courtroom or legislative argument, consistent with the series' focus on “the morals of trade.” The numbered divisions also allow Tufts to pivot from ancient philosophy to contemporary war without abruptness.

Setting and Temporal Anchors

Published in 1918, the text is deeply marked by World War I. Tufts references “the military lessons of this war,” the expansion of Germany, and the potential for “frightfulness yet to be discovered by chemist and bacteriologist.” Yet he also draws on earlier eras—Plato, Egyptian and Greek artisans, Tyrian and Florentine traders—to argue that cooperation is an enduring human project. The setting of the lectures at the University of California, praised as “one of the most notable leaders” in democratic education, provides a local, institutional anchor for his argument that educational systems can mitigate economic inequality. This blend of ancient and contemporary references gives the work a layered temporal texture.

Recurring Motif: Power and Its Uses

A persistent concern throughout the excerpts is the ethical use of power. Tufts asks, “How can this great power be coöperatively used? Is it serving all or a few?” He applies this question to political power, property, and international relations. The motif recurs in his discussion of “dominance” versus cooperation, and in his warning that militarism can corrupt even democratic peoples. The phrase “power of one man over his fellows” echoes earlier references to mastery over nature, suggesting that the same drive for control can be turned inward against society. Tufts does not resolve this tension but insists that cooperation, not dominance, is the more hopeful path—a claim grounded in America's experiments with political, economic, and religious cooperation.

Tufts writes as a philosopher engaging with urgent public questions, not as a detached theorist. Readers attentive to his diction will notice how legal and economic terms carry moral weight. The structure of the lecture rewards those who follow its cumulative logic, while the historical references invite reflection on whether cooperation has advanced since 1918. This edition preserves the original diaeresis in coöperation, a typographical detail that underscores the author's deliberate, careful approach to his subject.

There’s something humbling in how Tufts traces cooperation back to our earliest bonds, then watches it strain under modern power. It makes me think of the old dictionaries I keep returning to—how A Philosophical Dictionary, Volume 09 — Reading Companion lingers on words whose meanings have quietly shifted. Both books feel like conversations with someone who noticed that change, and didn’t hurry past it.