A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion — A Closer Reading

Exercises Against Appearances

The text includes a section titled “How we must exercise ourselves against appearances.” Epictetus treats everyday misfortunes as test questions. A son’s death, a disinheritance, a condemnation by Caesar—each is presented as a premise: “the thing is not within the power of the will: it is not an evil.” The student’s task is to separate the neutral fact from the emotional verdict. The method is repetitive and almost catechistic, designed to retrain automatic responses. The teacher warns that if we also adopt a philosophy that “helps to push us on towards” pleasure, we will be overpowered. The goal is to reach a state where we “never assent to anything of which there is not an appearance capable of being comprehended.”

Duty and the Threefold Classification

In one passage, Epictetus distinguishes three kinds of duties: those directed toward a thing’s existence, those toward its existence in a particular kind, and “the chief or leading things themselves.” Applied to a human being, the material (flesh) is not to be valued; what matters are the leading activities: “engaging in public business, marrying, begetting children, venerating God, taking care of parents.” These are to be performed “according to our nature,” which he defines as free, noble, and modest. Pleasure is demoted to a “minister” or “servant” that should keep us constant in acts conformable to nature. The hierarchy is explicit: the workmanship matters more than the silver.

A Philosopher’s Frustration and a Rhetorician’s Suit

Two brief anecdotes reveal the social context of Epictetus’s teaching. In one, the philosopher Italicus, vexed with his friends, says “I cannot bear it, you are killing me; you will make me such as that man is,” pointing to Epictetus. The remark suggests that Epictetus was seen as a model of endurance—or perhaps of irritating detachment. In another, a rhetorician going to Rome on a suit asks Epictetus’s opinion. Epictetus replies that he has “no rule” about whether the man will succeed or fail, but can advise on how he will behave. The distinction underscores the Stoic focus on character rather than outcomes.

Readers should note that the excerpts are incomplete; the full Discourses and Encheiridion contain many more arguments and examples. Long’s translation, while dated, preserves the direct, conversational tone of a teacher addressing students. The biographical note is brief and cautious, flagging gaps in the historical record. Those new to Stoicism may find the Encheiridion a more concise starting point, while the Discourses offer the reasoning behind its precepts.

Reading Epictetus on steering the will inward, I remembered sitting with my grandfather's worn copy of The Philosophy of History, Vol. 1 of 2 — Edition Insights one rainy afternoon, sensing how vast patterns can feel almost indifferent, yet strangely consoling. Both books whisper that we inherit more than our own days, and that quiet acceptance is its own form of freedom. That feeling lingers, even now.