Cora May Williams opens her 1893 study by declaring she has considered only those ethical systems founded on evolutionary theory that have been elaborated into independent theories, omitting practical or exhortative works. This deliberate narrowing of scope signals a rigorous, theoretical approach. In the preface, she reflects on the difficulty of acknowledging intellectual debts, noting that much of what one reads becomes assimilated and changed in the process of thought—a metaphor of growth by imperceptible degrees. She singles out Herbert Spencer as an unavoidable influence, yet also credits her first philosophy teacher, Professor M. Stuart Phelps, for a general orientation not tied to any specific theory.

Scope and Method

Williams explicitly limits her review to works that present a distinctly worked-out theory of morals, excluding treatises that are merely practical or compilations of facts. She includes Georg von Gizycki's Moralphilosophie despite its popular form, arguing that the warp of Evolution is clearly perceptible throughout. For Höffding's ethics, she used the German edition translated with his cooperation, showing attention to textual authority. Her method is analytical: she examines each system's internal logic rather than offering a summary of evolutionary ethics as a whole.

The Problem of Intellectual Influence

In her preface, Williams offers a striking meditation on the difficulty of tracing influences. She writes that the growth of thought is like any other growth, by imperceptible degrees and infinitesimal increments, and that we breathe in ideas from our mental atmosphere as we breathe in perfumes or infections from our physical atmosphere. This organic metaphor extends to her view of heredity and adaptation later in the text, where she describes evolution as a process of mutual adjustment of all parts engaged in it. The preface thus foreshadows her theoretical commitments.

Critique of Spencer's Definition of Life

Williams engages directly with Spencer's definition of life as the continual adjustment of inner relations to outer relations. She argues this is evidently incomplete, because evolution is not only the adjustment of inner to outer relations, but also the adjustment of outer to inner relations, as well as of inner relations among themselves. Her phrasing—it is a process of mutual adjustment of all the parts engaged in it—reveals a holistic, systemic view. This critique is grounded in her earlier analysis of cause and effect, where she insists that the cause of anything must be seen as merely a factor in manifold conditions.

Cause, Effect, and Moral Responsibility

Williams examines the concept of cause and effect in relation to moral acts. She asks: which shall we regard as the cause of an evil act—the character of a man or the temptation offered by circumstances? Her answer is that neither is complete without the other, and both are involved in the whole complexity of the universe, through heredity on the one hand and external nature on the other. This passage illustrates her careful reasoning about moral responsibility within an evolutionary framework, avoiding simplistic determinism while acknowledging the interdependence of all factors.

Williams's prose is dense and philosophical, demanding careful reading. Her preface and analytical sections reward attention to her precise definitions and metaphors. Readers interested in the history of evolutionary ethics will find a systematic engagement with key theorists, though the excerpts do not reveal her final conclusions. The text is best approached as a work of critical philosophy rather than a popular introduction.